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DEBATE 
CAN HANDGUNS BE EFFECTIVELY REGULATED? 
The FBI has recently reported that violent crime has increased for 
the second straight year across the nation.  In particular, the FBI’s re-
port demonstrates that in major metropolitan areas, such as Philadel-
phia, homicides have increased by 6.7%. 
In the midst of this upsurge in violent crime, Professors James B. 
Jacobs, of New York University, and David Kairys, of Temple Univer-
sity, reengage with America’s long-running debate over the effective-
ness of gun (specifically handgun) control regulation.  Professor Ja-
cobs initiates the debate by asking whether it is realistic to pursue a 
strategy of enhanced regulation of firearms in a country in which 
“there are 300 million firearms in civilian hands,” and “the large ma-
jority of firearms used in crime . . . are either stolen or purchased on 
the black market.”  After providing a number of critiques of what he 
believes to be a shifting target set by pro-gun-control advocates, Pro-
fessor Jacobs concludes that “[g]un control offers no magic bullet for 
reducing crime, suicide, or accidental deaths and injuries.”   
In contrast, Professor Kairys does not consider the current 
amount of handgun regulation to be nearly enough to satisfy what 
common sense should tell us is necessary to adequately ensure that 
handguns are not easily available to criminals and youth.  He specifi-
cally notes that any emphasis on the “black market” in handguns over-
shadows the disturbing reality that “any person without a record can 
buy large quantities of cheap, easily concealed handguns and sell 
them to others indiscriminately, often without violating any law.”   
At a deeper level, both Professor Jacobs and Professor Kairys agree 
that the debate on handgun control “at its core is [related to] a per-
sonal, cultural, and political identification of guns with personal self-
worth . . . , freedom, liberty, and . . . God and country.”  Whereas Pro-
fessor Jacobs accepts this as a political reality and uses it as an anchor 
from which to engage in this discussion, Professor Kairys steadfastly 
disagrees:  “The best hope for emerging from our disgraceful state of 
denial is to respectfully engage and challenge the cultural and politi-
cal identification of guns with our nation’s highest ideals and the 
deadly legacy of that identification as it is currently conceived.”  
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OPENING STATEMENT 
What Can We Expect of Gun Control? 
James B. Jacobs
†
 
“Gun Control” is a topic that typically throws off more heat than 
light.  Indeed, as an issue it functions symbolically, contributing to the 
“culture war.”  Gun rights advocates and proponents of gun controls 
both stake out claims to the moral high ground.  The former believe 
that the citizenry has a right and duty to be armed in defense of self 
and collectivity and that guns are good; the latter believe that guns are 
inherently evil, cause crime, homicide, suicide and accidents.  Each 
side demonizes the other. 
I do not wish to argue that guns are good or bad, or that a new 
country (created on a deserted island) would be better off with an 
armed or disarmed citizenry.  My question is this:  if guns are a prob-
lem in U.S. society today, what remedial policy options are available?  
This question forces us to specify the problem.  In fact there are three 
possible problems:  gun crime, gun suicide, and gun accidents.  Gun 
crime seems to drive most proposals for gun control, although each 
year there are twice as many firearm suicides as homicides.  Gun acci-
dents are relatively few in number, and fatality rates (deaths per 
100,000 population) have decreased over the twentieth century.  In 
the limited space available here, I will predominantly focus on gun 
controls directed at gun crime, but it is important to keep in mind 
that some gun control proposals seem to be directed at the two other 
problems. 
In my view, our policy options for addressing gun crime are 
sharply limited by certain facts:  1) there are 300 million firearms in 
civilian hands; 2) 40% of households have at least one firearm; 3) a 
large percentage of Americans, including elites, believes in a constitu-
tional right to keep and bear arms, a belief that would not be shaken 
even by a Supreme Court decision to the contrary; and 4) most gun 
crime is committed by individuals who have criminal records or are 
significantly involved in crime, including violent gang behavior and 
drug trafficking. 
 
†
 Chief Justice Warren E. Burger Professor of Constitutional Law and the Courts, New 
York University School of Law; Director, Center for Research in Crime & Justice.  He is 
the author of CAN GUN CONTROL WORK? (Oxford Univ. Press 2002). 
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There are many types of gun control that range from imprisoning 
armed felons to imposing tort liability on manufacturers.  The most 
politically popular type of gun control in the U.S. is the severe pun-
ishment of crimes committed with firearms.  All Americans support 
severe sentences for firearms offenders, except for those who advocate 
reduced punishment and imprisonment across the board.  Federal 
and state criminal codes already provide for long prison terms for 
armed felons.  Many police departments and prosecutors’ offices have 
special programs to identify, fast-track, convict, and assure long prison 
terms for armed felons.  For at least the last decade, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice has made enforcement of the federal “felon-in-
possession” (of a firearm) law a top priority.  Local police departments 
have launched initiatives to remove firearms from so-called “hot 
spots,” locations where a disproportionate number of violent crime 
occurs.  There is little, if any, political impediment to enforcing these 
laws and policies. 
Tougher law enforcement action against those who commit 
crimes with guns is not what most gun control advocates seem to have 
in mind when they debate gun controls.  Instead, they seem to believe 
that gun crime could be significantly reduced by prohibiting or signifi-
cantly restricting civilian (nonmilitary and nonpolice) access to firearms.  I 
disagree.  Data show that there is no correlation, at the state or city 
levels, between firearms density (percentage of population owning 
firearms) and rate of gun crime.  Even if there were, prohibiting or 
substantially restricting the extent of gun ownership of all firearms 
(300 million now in circulation) or, alternatively, just handguns (100 
million now in circulation), is not a realistic option for the U.S. and 
serves only to energize gun owners and polarize the population. 
There is no conceivable scenario whereby firearms prohibition 
could muster a majority (or supermajority if a constitutional amend-
ment is necessary).  The idea that gun crime in our inner cities (much 
of which takes place among drug dealers and gang members with sig-
nificant criminal records) will be significantly reduced by taking guns 
away from ranchers, farmers, small town residents and suburbanites is, 
to say the least, a hard sell. 
I have friends who, though they regard the current drug war as a 
disaster, welcome the idea of a war on firearms (meaning firearms 
owners).  I urge them to think through the likely costs and benefits of 
firearms prohibition.  They should look carefully at two previous pro-
hibitions in American history:  national alcohol prohibition (1919-
1932), and the current prohibition of many mood- and mind-altering 
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drugs.  Doesn’t the history of those prohibitions lead to the conclu-
sion that firearms prohibition would be a disaster? 
Firearms prohibition would be harder to enforce than alcohol or 
drug prohibition.  Firearms owners, unlike alcohol and drug users, do 
not need to replenish their supply constantly.  A single purchase can 
last a lifetime.  Indeed, several individuals (criminals) can share the 
same firearm.  Admittedly, some alcohol and drug users are strongly 
motivated by physical or psychological addiction to purchase illegal 
drugs.  However, gun ownership is also strongly motivated by anxiety 
about personal security, the ideological belief in the right to keep and 
bear arms, the enjoyment of hunting and target shooting (more 
Americans participate in target shooting than play tennis), and by 
criminal intent. 
Just as millions of Americans continued drinking after national al-
cohol prohibition and millions continue to purchase and ingest illegal 
narcotics today, so would tens of millions of Americans refuse to turn 
in their guns.  Is the country ready for an all-out enforcement drive 
against disobedient, but otherwise law-abiding, citizens who possess 
firearms illegally?  Right now we devote massive resources to drug en-
forcement, including about one-fourth of our state prison cells.  
Whether this has reduced illicit drug use is debatable, but there is no 
question as to its devastating impact on individuals, families and 
communities. 
Are we prepared to devote equivalent resources to enforcing a 
firearms or handgun prohibition? Are we ready to prosecute and pun-
ish tens of thousands of otherwise law-abiding individuals in order to 
prevent crime (and suicide?) committed by individuals who have al-
ready demonstrated their unwillingness to comply with gun laws as 
well as with homicide, assault, robbery and other criminal laws?  
Would district attorneys who have to stand for election aggressively 
prosecute otherwise law-abiding neighbors who refuse to turn in their 
guns?  Would juries (unanimously) vote to convict?  Surely there 
would be many states where law enforcement would be totally stymied.  
Even in states with pro-firearm-prohibition majorities, there would be 
counties where gun owners would be a majority or at least a vetoing 
minority (especially given the unanimous jury requirement). 
Shouldn’t we anticipate that, as with Prohibition and the current 
war on drugs, firearms prohibition would quickly spawn a flourishing 
black market?  Black markets in firearms function efficiently in coun-
tries such as Japan, Britain, and Taiwan where there is no legal retail-
ing of guns.  If Congress were to consider seriously a firearms prohibi-
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tion bill, gun sales would skyrocket as people positioned themselves 
for firearms scarcity.  This is exactly what happened when “assault ri-
fles” were banned in the mid-1990s.  Under prohibition, firearms 
would continue to be produced in clandestine workshops and to be 
smuggled into the U.S. from abroad. 
I know, of course, that gun control doesn’t only mean prohibition 
and that gun controllers often talk about better regulation.  Typically, 
however, a particular regulatory strategy turns out to be just a “step.”  
Invariably, any successful gun control is followed by proposals for 
more controls.  The 1994 Brady Law is a good example.  The ink was 
hardly dry before gun control advocates put forward “Brady II,” a 
comprehensive proposal for mandatory licensing of gun owners and 
national registration of guns.  This bill, which has been introduced in 
several Congresses, has never gotten out of committee.  Some promi-
nent gun controllers (e.g., sociology professor Amitai Etzioni and law 
professor Norval Morris) have criticized such regulatory “half-way 
measures” as inadequate and urged total “civilian” disarmament. 
Gun control advocates (including New York City’s mayor, Michael 
Bloomberg) claim that a small number of federally licensed firearms 
dealers (known as FFLs) knowingly violate the law by selling guns to 
ineligible persons, some of whom are in the business of supplying 
guns to criminals.  I agree that these criminal dealers should be shut 
down and punished.  I support giving the Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) more resources to audit, moni-
tor and investigate retail firearms dealers.  I would also support a ban 
on gun shows, which provide easy opportunities for the sale and pur-
chase of stolen guns.  However, it is important to point out that every 
study of where criminals get their guns finds that the large majority of 
firearms used in crime are not purchased from FFLs, but are either 
stolen or purchased on the black market (not surprising since indi-
viduals with a criminal record cannot legally purchase a firearm from 
an FFL).  Thus, tightening up the legitimate market will do little to 
keep guns out of criminals’ hands.  If guns can be fairly easily ob-
tained on the black market in the Netherlands, Japan, Taiwan, and 
the United Kingdom, it is hard to believe that the U.S. can implement 
some regulatory strategy that will prevent criminals from obtaining 
firearms. 
Gun control is hard to debate because the target keeps shifting.  
No matter which form of gun control I focus on, a pro-gun-control 
advocate will inevitably say, “That’s not the control I favor; what about 
XYZ (some other control)?”  For example, some gun controllers favor 
policy initiatives like trigger locks, safe-storage laws, and smart-gun 
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technology.  These proposals are aimed at firearms accidents rather 
than gun crime.  There is nothing wrong with that, but the number of 
accidental firearms deaths and injuries in the U.S. is quite small, ap-
proximately 800 accidental firearms deaths per year—compared, for 
example, with approximately 4,000 deaths by drowning.  Additionally, 
the effectiveness of these safety proposals is by no means assured.  
They would be difficult to enforce and irresponsible firearms owners 
(i.e., the ones most likely to have accidents) would be the least likely 
to comply. 
Gun control offers no magic bullet for reducing crime, suicide, or 
accidental deaths and injuries.  More than a crime control agenda, it 
functions as a symbol that polarizes society.  In the midst of heated 
debate and conflict, it is important for gun controllers to remember 
that gun owners are not the enemy.  
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REBUTTAL 
Challenging the Normalcy of Handgun Violence 
David Kairys
†
 
The most prominent arguments against gun regulation have been 
made by John Lott, whose book title, More Guns, Less Crime (1998), 
says it all, and by the ubiquitous Mary Rosh, a phony identity Lott used 
to defend his widely discredited analyses.  But Professor Jacobs is not 
John Lott, and this Debate need not waste bytes on the more-guns-
cure-all approach.  Professor Jacobs presents reasoned, contextual ar-
guments in support of his conclusion that regulation of guns beyond 
measures more or less already in place, though well-intentioned, can-
not succeed.  His challenge to gun regulation is not a matter of prin-
ciple or NRA doctrine, but practical:  gun regulation cannot “signifi-
cantly reduce” deaths and injuries. 
However, Professor Jacobs ignores or underplays the reality and 
significance of the easy availability of handguns on urban streets and, 
increasingly, on the streets of many suburban and rural communi-
ties—which is enabled by the lack of regulation and the surprisingly 
legal channeling of handguns to criminals and youth.  The terrible 
toll handgun violence exacts on individuals, families, communities 
and cities is traceable to the regularly ignored, essentially unregulated, 
handgun marketing system.  Professor Jacobs makes some good 
points—some handgun regulation proposals that have gotten wide-
spread attention seem more feel-good than effective, and there is no 
easy fix.  But much can and should be done.  The main problem is 
what I have called the “regrettable normalcy” with which we regularly 
approach handgun violence, the pervasive, numbing acceptance that 
fifty handgun deaths a day is a normal or inevitable aspect of life in 
the U.S.A. 
 
 
 
†
 James E. Beasley Professor of Law, Beasley School of Law, Temple University.  Profes-
sor Kairys most recently wrote in this area in Why Are Handguns So Accessible on Urban 
Streets?, in AGAINST THE WALL:  POOR, YOUNG, BLACK AND MALE (Elijah Anderson, ed., 
forthcoming 2008), from which this was partially drawn.  He is working on a memoir, 
PHILADELPHIA FREEDOM, MEMOIR OF A CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER (forthcoming 2008), 
which includes an account of his conceiving the city lawsuits against handgun manu-
facturers. 
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Easy Availability and Regulation 
 
Some facets of the handgun marketing system that contribute to 
easy availability are well known:  gun shows, mail order and online 
sales, and straw purchases.  What is not commonly understood is that, 
in most states, within the law, anyone who does not have a record can 
go to a licensed gun store, legally buy as many handguns as he or she 
wants, and walk out the door with them.  The only limit is the limit on 
the buyer’s credit card. 
In certain circumstances, a dealer is required to send a notice of 
multiple purchases by one person to the ATF.  Professor Jacobs refers 
to this in his book as “regulat[ion]” of multiple purchases but does 
not subject it to the rigorous analysis he applies to proposed gun regu-
lations not already in place.  This reporting requirement has little sig-
nificance because the purchase is not illegal and the purchaser has no 
legal duty to report or explain what he or she does with all those 
handguns. 
Nor are there meaningful limits on resale of handguns.  Under 
federal law and the law of most states, a gun owner can sell guns to 
someone else without any record check.  Purchases from a nondealer, 
common at gun shows and on the streets, are not subject to a record 
check because the Brady Act only applies to licensed dealers.  Con-
victed felons and underage youth are not allowed to buy or possess 
handguns, but the marketing system up to that point is largely legal.  
The person who sells a handgun to a person with a felony conviction 
or who is underage has no meaningful, enforceable responsibility.  
Nor are the identities of owners of handguns, or the persons to whom 
they transfer ownership, registered or maintained by any governmen-
tal entity unless state law so provides, and most do not. 
So any person without a record can buy large quantities of cheap, 
easily concealed handguns and sell them to others indiscriminately, 
often without violating any law and usually without having to worry 
much about getting arrested, prosecuted, or convicted.  Though the 
handgun debate is commonly cast in terms of “illegal guns” and what 
Professor Jacobs refers to as a “black market,” one of the core prob-
lems resides in what continues to be legal and unregulated. 
The level of multiple sales by licensed dealers is high, which is why 
limiting purchases to one per month, or twelve each year, is consid-
ered a reform.  Criminals and youth gain access to handguns through 
distribution channels that start with a relatively small number of li-
censed dealers.  The ATF has found that only 1% of the dealers sell 
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57% of the guns involved in crime.  The manufacturers could easily 
monitor the distributors and dealers who sell their products; the ATF 
provides them data on a daily basis. 
Professor Jacobs avoids the essentially unregulated market struc-
ture by the true but not germane statement that “the large majority of 
firearms used in crime are not purchased from [licensed dealers], but 
are either stolen or purchased on the black market.”  The criminal 
usually gets the handgun after at least one prior owner, often a straw 
purchaser, got it from the dealer and passed it on in the “black” (but 
largely legal) market.  ATF studies show a short “time-to-crime,” the 
period between the initial purchase from a dealer—the last transac-
tion in the chain that existing regulations require to be recorded—
and the crime.  Few handguns used in crimes have been stolen, which 
is not surprising since it is so easy to get them new, right out of the 
box. 
The recent Virginia Tech shootings have drawn attention to the 
inadequacies of the database used for Brady Act record checks.  The 
more important, but usually ignored, truth is that it is easy for men-
tally deranged people contemplating mass murder to get handguns.  
The Virginia Tech shooter could have bought his semiautomatic 
handguns without any record check at the frequent gun shows in Vir-
ginia or from easily located nondealers. 
A variety of regulatory measures are available that would signifi-
cantly limit the easy access to handguns currently extended to crimi-
nals and youth and would save lives.  Some have been tried and are 
supported by reputable studies.  Many can be implemented without 
interfering with rifles and shotguns, hunting, target shooting, or rea-
sonable self-defense and handgun ownership rights.  They are usually 
more effective if done nationally, since local regulations are often un-
dermined by a lack of regulation next door. 
We should register handguns and license handgun owners.  All 
sales, transfers, and thefts of handguns should be mandatorily re-
ported, maintained in government records, and subject to the Brady 
Act record check.  There should be strong, specific “straw purchase” 
laws.  We should limit the number of handguns purchased.  The large 
urban areas of the nation, where unregulated handgun markets have 
taken such a terrible toll, should have the power to regulate handguns 
within their borders. 
Handgun prohibition, which Professor Jacobs addresses at length, 
is not on my list of national reforms, although strong arguments in fa-
vor of it have been made by the Violence Policy Center and others.  
Measures that create appropriate records and responsibilities con-
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nected to purchase and ownership of handguns are more likely to be 
effective and politically viable.  For example, there should be a duty to 
report any transfer or theft of a handgun, and some (less than full) 
criminal and civil responsibility for the harm subsequently done by 
that handgun if the transfer or theft is not timely reported.  This ad-
dresses both new handguns and the huge stock of existing handguns.  
It also has the best chance of overcoming the longstanding resistance 
to regulation, which I agree with Professor Jacobs is cultural and po-
litical and should be respected.  One difference between us is that I 
see such resistance as a barrier to reform that should be engaged and 
challenged, rather than a reason to reject regulation. 
 
Challenging the Normalcy of Handgun Violence 
 
Why is the virtually unregulated market in handguns that provides 
easy availability to criminals and youth allowed to thrive when the con-
sequences are clear day after day, gloomy statistic after gloomy statis-
tic? 
The gun lobby, which includes the NRA, the gun industry, and 
other gun-focused groups, is well-funded and very influential, espe-
cially with politicians.  They have had their way with Congress as well 
as with most state legislatures.  After Bobby Kennedy was killed with a 
small handgun in 1968, Congress was moved to ban “Saturday night 
specials,” but added, at the last minute, an exemption for Saturday 
night specials manufactured in the United States.  In 1976, Congress 
limited the jurisdiction of the Consumer Products Safety Commission 
(CPSC) to exclude anything to do with guns or ammunition, so the 
agency cannot entertain a complaint that, for example, defective am-
munition is blowing up in the hands of hunters.  In the early 1990s, 
Congress reacted to the leading public health studies showing the 
danger of handguns in the home by barring the Center for Disease 
Control (CDC), which had funded the studies, from any research on 
public health “to advocate or promote gun control.”  Recently, Con-
gress has let the ban on assault weapons expire; restricted the ATF 
from providing important data and information on guns used in 
crime to the public, scholars, or law enforcement; and granted a 
broad immunity to the gun industry in response to the city handgun 
lawsuits.  The gun industry is exempt from the rules that apply to eve-
ryone else. 
The gun lobby is well-funded and powerful, but there are many 
well-funded, powerful lobbies that do not succeed to this extent.  Lead 
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paint and PCBs were banned despite rich, powerful lobbies represent-
ing those industries. 
Something else is going on, and at its core is a personal, cultural, 
and political identification of guns with personal self-worth and with 
our highest ideals—freedom, liberty and, for some, God and country.  
Many Americans think and feel on a gut level that any attempt to put 
limits on guns or absolute Second Amendment rights is a terrible 
threat.  Their thinking is similar to that of many more Americans 
about the protection of freedom of speech in the First Amendment.  
So I can disagree with what you say but defend your right to say it, 
even if what you say is deplorable or disgusting to me.  One can de-
plore what some do with guns, but defend the unregulated right to 
them.  There are, of course, differences, but the logic is similar and 
embodies a very American conception of rights. 
The most extreme form of this identification of guns with free-
dom, the NRA version, leads to opposition to restrictions on Tef-
lon-coated bullets, called “cop-killers” because they can pierce bullet-
proof vests.  Less extreme versions have more widespread and 
significant effects on American society and politics, contributing, for 
example, to the gun lobby’s success with the strategy of arguing that 
all that is needed is enforcement of existing laws.  Gun identification 
in particular has been effectively tapped in recent times when com-
bined with negative messages about government, cities, and ur-
ban-dwellers that often have a racial dimension. 
In communities that are deprived and struggling, the easy avail-
ability of handguns has created a daily disaster, fed false stereotypes 
(only a small proportion of black young men shoot people), provided 
another rationalization for the failure to deal with poverty or dis-
crimination, and sapped efforts to reform and regain hope.  Though 
the casualty numbers are usually lower in wealthier and whiter com-
munities and rationalizations for denial are as easy to come by as 
handguns, the current level of handgun violence undermines the so-
cial and moral fabric of American society. 
The best hope for emerging from our disgraceful state of denial is 
to respectfully engage and challenge the cultural and political identi-
fication of guns with our nation’s highest ideals and the deadly legacy 
of that identification as it is currently conceived.  It will take insightful 
and courageous leadership.  Unregulated handgun markets have been 
imposed on urban and minority communities and have continuing 
broad support almost exclusively in rural areas.  Large cities facing 
declining job opportunities, losses in population and tax revenues, 
and rising levels of deprivation are being forced to accommodate eas-
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ily available handguns, which may well draw considerable opposition 
even in rural areas if explained and debated openly and honestly.  In 
any event, denial and political expediency have reigned too long.  The 
loss of life, the economic and social costs, and the undermining of 
safety and the quality of life in urban America are unacceptable. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
James B. Jacobs 
Professor Kairys offers several proposals for preventing criminals 
and the “mentally deranged” from obtaining firearms and suggests 
one strategy for preventing firearms accidents.  A brief examination of  
these proposals demonstrates the difficulties and costs of implement-
ing new gun controls, and casts doubt on the likelihood that they 
could reduce gun crime or gun accidents. 
 
One Gun per Month 
 
I suppose that very few law-abiding citizens (with the important 
exception of collectors) require more than twelve firearms purchases 
per year or more than one purchase per month.  However, I doubt 
that this type of gun control would produce any discernible reduc-
tions in gun crimes. 
What is the problem for which limiting firearms (handgun) pur-
chasers to one per month is the solution?  While not spelled out in 
Professor Kairys’ essay, that problem must be illegal firearms traffick-
ing.  Permitting a single purchaser to buy an unlimited number of 
firearms from a single retailer facilitates the business of selling fire-
arms to criminals who themselves cannot legally purchase firearms 
from a licensed dealer.  The logic of the one-gun-per-month strategy 
is, if purchasers were limited to twelve guns per year, traffickers would 
have fewer firearms to sell to criminals, fewer criminals would obtain 
guns, and fewer gun crimes would occur. 
The proposal to limit firearms purchasers to one gun per month 
assumes that large-volume traffickers are supplying the criminal mar-
ket.  The studies I’ve seen find that most traffickers deal in very small 
quantities of firearms, usually engaging in intermittent sales.  The 
criminal market itself probably doesn’t generate a huge demand for 
guns.  Unlike drugs, which users need to replace constantly, criminals 
do not need to replace their guns often.  A single gun could last for 
years, even for an entire criminal career. 
If there are high-volume gun traffickers who aim to supply the il-
legal market, is it likely that they themselves purchase firearms in high 
volume from the same dealer?  That would call attention to them-
selves and increase the risk of a law enforcement investigation.  It is 
more likely that professional traffickers would direct associates to pur-
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chase guns in small quantities from a large number of different FFLs.  
Indeed, isn’t it even more likely that they would acquire their stock 
through thefts and purchases on the secondary (used guns) market?  
Certainly, they could shift to these acquisition strategies if a one-gun-
per-month limitation interfered with their ability to obtain sufficient 
stock. 
Concocting a regulatory scheme to prevent criminals from obtain-
ing firearms in a society in which 300 million firearms are already held 
by private individuals is like trying to come up with a scheme to pre-
vent alcoholics from purchasing alcohol in a society saturated with al-
cohol outlets.  If comprehensive criminalization of drug trafficking 
and mass imprisonment of drug sellers and possessors cannot prevent 
illicit drug users from regularly replenishing their drugs, how likely is 
it that criminals could be prevented from obtaining firearms?  Even in 
prohibitionist Britain and Japan criminals are able to obtain guns. 
Current federal law requires FFLs to inform the ATF of the iden-
tity of any person who purchases multiple (more than one) firearms 
within a five-day period.  Failure to notify the ATF would put the FFL’s 
license at risk.  It is not clear whether Professor Kairys believes that 
there has been widespread FFL noncompliance with this law or 
whether he is more skeptical of the ATF’s willingness and competence 
to investigate multiple sales.  If so, I don’t know the facts on which he 
bases that skepticism.  But if the regulator won’t or can’t administer 
and enforce current law, I don’t see the point of proposing more 
regulations. 
 
Register Handguns 
 
Professor Kairys believes that if handguns had to be registered, 
criminals could not obtain them.  Presumably, criminals would not 
come forward to register, owners would not dare sell their registered 
firearms to criminals, and criminals would not be able to obtain guns 
on the black market. 
Americans will not register their firearms as long as there is any 
possibility that firearms could be banned or confiscated.  They are 
well aware that influential U.S. elites believe that the Second Amend-
ment guarantees no individual right to keep and bear arms and prefer 
a society where only the police and limited others are “permitted” to 
possess firearms.  The British example is indelibly imprinted on the 
minds of American gun owners.  After the 1996 Dunblane massacre, 
Britain was able to implement a nationwide firearms confiscation be-
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cause there was a preexisting registration system that provided infor-
mation on the whereabouts of all firearms. 
A program to register the 100 million handguns now in private 
hands would require a huge enforcement apparatus, perhaps some-
thing like the bureaucracy needed to administer motor vehicle regis-
tration.  It would have to anticipate massive noncompliance and civil 
disobedience.  In the mid-1990s, a number of states enacted laws re-
quiring the registration of assault weapons.  Estimates indicate that no 
jurisdiction was able to achieve more than 10% compliance.  Are we 
ready to start jailing or heavily fining handgun registration resisters?  
And even if we are, do you really believe that criminals would be un-
able to obtain handguns on the black market? 
 
License Handgun Owners 
 
Would licensing handgun owners be a viable strategy for reducing 
gun crime and/or suicides and accidents?  If, as I assume, a criminal 
record would make one ineligible to obtain a handgun license, most 
criminals would not apply.  They would hardly be deterred by a law 
making it a crime to possess an unlicensed firearm; they are not now 
deterred by federal and state laws making it a felony punishable by a 
maximum ten-year prison term for possessing a firearm after having 
previously been convicted of a felony. 
Many law-abiding gun owners also would not apply for a license 
fearing that it would be used to construct a list which, at some future 
point, would facilitate prohibition and confiscation.  Enforcing a con-
troversial licensing scheme would be no small challenge.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) 
(holding that Congress cannot force state and local officials to con-
duct criminal background checks for firearms purchasers), makes it 
certain that Congress could not require state and local officials to do 
the enforcing.  So, federal administration and enforcement would be 
required (imagine the size of such a program:  suppose we needed 
just half the personnel required to administer motor vehicles registra-
tion).  Before endorsing such a scheme, consider the difficulties we 
currently face in enforcing the federal immigration laws. 
 
Preventing Mentally Ill Persons from Obtaining Handguns 
 
Professor Kairys says that the Virginia Tech massacre (perpetrated 
by a mentally ill person) shows that the Brady background check sys-
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tem isn’t working effectively, but he doesn’t propose a remedy.  Any 
remedial proposal would have to recognize that, thankfully, incidents 
like the Virginia Tech massacre are rare and that their perpetrators 
frequently commit suicide in the course of the crime.  Such individu-
als are practically impossible to deter. 
The federal Brady Law prohibits a person who has ever been in-
voluntarily committed to a mental hospital from ever purchasing a 
firearm.  It is a federal crime to knowingly sell a firearm to such a per-
son. 
It’s not the NRA that prevents the successful creation of an FBI 
database of names of persons whose mental illnesses may make them 
unreliable gun possessors.  The mental health community adamantly 
opposes sending to the FBI (National Instant Check) database the 
names of those involuntary committed to mental hospitals, much less 
the names of those who commit themselves voluntarily and those in 
outpatient mental health treatment programs.  They argue that trans-
mitting such information to the FBI would deter people from seeking 
help and, ironically, they fear the misuse of such lists (cf. gun registra-
tion).  Moreover, of course, many potential deranged killers have 
never been involuntarily hospitalized.   
 
Strong Anti-Straw-Purchaser Laws 
 
Professor Kairys advocates strong anti-straw-purchaser laws.  What 
does that mean?  Would he criminalize a firearms purchase by a per-
son who intends to transfer the firearm to someone else?  If so, that 
would make it a crime to buy a shotgun, rifle or handgun as a gift 
(what if the owner transferred the firearm a year or two later?).  I sup-
pose that wouldn’t be so bad; the gift giver could give the gift recipi-
ent a gift certificate or cash instead.  But it is hard to see what such a 
law would accomplish. 
More likely, Professor Kairys favors criminalizing the purchaser 
who intends to transfer the firearm to a person he knows is ineligible 
to purchase or possess a firearm.  Of course, that it is already a federal 
felony.  It is also a crime to conspire to transfer a firearm to an ineli-
gible person.  Perhaps Professor Kairys’s idea is to expand the net of 
criminal liability to the phase of the transaction after purchase but be-
fore transfer.  I have no problem with that, but don’t see how it would 
add to deterrence or prevention. 
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Give the Consumer Product Safety Commission Authority To Regulate Fire-
arms 
 
This proposal is directed at accidental firearms injuries caused by 
defective firearms and ammunition.  Is this really a problem?  Acci-
dental firearms accidents have been decreasing for decades.  Nearly 
all of these accidents involve reckless and negligent handling of the 
firearm, not a defective product.  In the event of an accident caused 
by an exploding bullet or weapon, the injured person can, under cur-
rent law, bring a tort suit against the manufacturer.  It is unclear what 
problem could be redressed by more Consumer Products Safety 
Commission regulation.   
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
David Kairys 
In many poor, mostly urban neighborhoods, it is easier for a 
young man or woman to get a handgun than an up-to-date school 
textbook or a regular job.  For the past few decades, we have seemed 
content to do little or nothing about poverty.  Professor Jacobs seems 
to say that we also have no alternative but to continue to sprinkle 
handguns on the most deprived and desperate among us in those and 
other communities.  He employs a range of arguments:  proposed 
regulations won’t work, won’t solve all or enough of the problem, will 
cause more problems, aren’t politically viable, or cannot garner com-
pliance.  Mostly the message is Reaganesque—government action to 
help those in need or to remedy social problems may feel good but 
won’t improve anything and usually makes things worse.  Where that 
argument fails because reputable studies and common sense support 
some proposed regulations, the response is a simple declaration: 
Americans will not register their firearms. 
Many Americans have registered their firearms, and a study done 
by the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health’s Center for 
Injury Research and Policy (available with other important studies and 
information on their Center for Gun Policy and Research website, 
http://www.jhsph.edu/gunpolicy/) supports the effectiveness of reg-
istration and licensing.  In cities in states without registration or li-
censing requirements, 84% of guns used in crimes were initially 
bought from a licensed dealer within the state; in contrast, in cities in 
states with registration and licensing systems, only 34% of guns used 
in crimes were initially bought from in-state licensed dealers. 
What if registration and licensing were nationally required, along 
with record checks for all transfers; appropriate criminal and civil re-
sponsibility for violation of registration, licensing, transfer or record-
check requirements; and some appropriate limit on the number of 
handgun purchases?  Handgun violence would not disappear, but 
there is every reason to believe that it would be significantly reduced, 
and investigation of crimes involving handguns would surely be easier.  
This could be done without authorizing or implementing searches for 
some or all of the infractions.  Everyone would know that if a handgun 
used in a crime once belonged to him or her, he or she could be 
prosecuted or face civil liability for failure to register or to report the 
transfer or theft of the handgun. 
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Professor Jacobs overplays the effectiveness of existing regulations 
while underplaying the effectiveness of proposed ones.  He empha-
sizes, again, the existing requirement that licensed dealers report to 
the ATF purchases of more than one gun within five days, and sug-
gests that I am challenging the ATF’s “willingness and competence” to 
do their jobs.  This misconceives my critique.  No report is required if 
the purchaser buys a second handgun six days after the first, or buys 
one every six days.  So a purchaser who has access to a calendar and 
can count to six can buy sixty handguns a year from the same licensed 
dealer—and sixty more from additional licensed dealers—without any 
dealer having any duty to report the sales to the ATF. 
Most basically, however, the regulation does not restrict multiple 
purchases or render them illegal, no matter the number purchased.  
The purchaser can buy all sixty—or any number—on one day.  A re-
port would be filed with the ATF, but the purchaser legally owns those 
handguns, can legally resell them without doing a Brady Act check or 
keeping any records, and has no obligation to explain what he does 
with them to the ATF or anybody else. 
This leaves the ATF with a nearly impossible task.  Licensed deal-
ers regularly tell multiple purchasers to say they are “collectors” if the 
ATF calls or knocks on the door, and that is usually the end of the 
matter.  The ATF can focus on the higher-quantity purchasers, but 
there are a lot of them, and the ATF is left with surveillance or com-
plicated stings to try to catch the multiple purchaser doing something 
illegal with handguns he legally owns and can legally resell.  This takes 
a great deal of time and resources, and the evidence required is not 
easy to obtain.  For example, if the ATF observes the multiple pur-
chaser reselling to someone they determine is a felon, they still need 
proof that he knew the buyer was a felon. 
If one is critiquing the effectiveness of regulations, this existing 
one—billed as a regulation of multiple purchases—seems a farce. 
Further, straw purchasing (buying a firearm for someone else or 
with the intent to resell) is commonly discussed as if it were illegal, but 
generally it is not.  Law enforcement is usually left with prosecutions 
for offenses they regularly call straw purchasing but are actually for ly-
ing on a government form.  Prosecutions are often unsuccessful, be-
cause, for example, the “lie” often isn’t a lie.  One can answer, truth-
fully, “yes” to the common question that asks whether one is the actual 
purchaser, while also having the intent to resell immediately or later.  
A purchaser should be required to state at the time of purchase 
whether and to whom he intends to transfer ownership of a handgun, 
there should be a Brady Act record check on the transferee, and the 
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transfer should be mandatorily reported, record-checked, and main-
tained in government records.  Buying with the unrevealed intent to 
transfer within a specified time period should be an offense, and the 
quantities and types of handguns purchased and subsequent transfers 
should be evidence of intent. 
We license and register our marriages, our cars, our cats and dogs.  
Why wouldn’t we keep track of a device that is designed to kill and 
that does such harm?  Contrary to Professor Jacobs’s unequivocal dec-
laration, most Americans support registration and licensing of hand-
guns.  In polls, general questions about more gun control regularly 
split the population about evenly pro and con.  But specific questions 
about registration and licensing of handguns regularly draw the sup-
port of about two-thirds to three-quarters of Americans, and of a ma-
jority of gun owners. 
The arguments against regulation have lasting credence only be-
cause the gun lobby can tap into that moderate version of the identifi-
cation of guns with freedom, which can make any regulation appear 
deeply threatening to many people.  This is the basic problem, not a 
good reason to conclude that we should continue to provide criminals 
and youth easy access to handguns. 
I have kept a rough tab of the handgun toll in the Philadelphia 
area as I have written my sections of this Debate in the late summer 
and early fall of 2007.  Philadelphia, like many other large cities, is 
having a particularly bad time with handguns.  Deaths and injuries are 
up the last two years, averaging about one death and five nonfatal in-
juries each day.  We are right on that average as I write.  Several of the 
shootings seem drug- or gang-related; some are insults and fights 
among teenagers that got out of hand; others include a conflict be-
tween former lovers, a bus driver and passenger caught in the cross-
fire, a three-year-old boy apparently hit by a stray bullet.  Not long ago, 
another boy who has come to symbolize the daily tragedies of so 
many, ten-year-old Faheem Thomas-Childs, was killed by a stray bullet 
as he walked to his elementary school.  I don’t feel comfortable leav-
ing them out of the mix of arguments, logic and studies that con-
sumes most of this and the public debate, and the stories of real peo-
ple killed or maimed are probably the best antidote for the dismal 
state of denial.  Something can be done about it if we respectfully and 
concretely engage and challenge, and outvote, the notion that all 
regulation of handguns poses a threat to gun ownership or self-
defense.  We should appeal to shared values, and emphasize the terri-
ble loss of life and limb, as well as the loss of the peace and safety of 
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our public places, that unregulated handgun markets impose on many 
communities and on the nation.  Regulatory schemes are available 
that take gun ownership seriously and basically require individual re-
sponsibility by handgun owners to protect the public from one of the 
greatest threats to urban public health over the last several decades. 
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